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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY UP AGAINST
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
INTRODUCTI6N
International law is a province of jurisprudence which is very
much in a state of flux and development today. One concept which
has undergone significant change during the last century is that of
the legal immunity, grounded in principles of sovereignty,1 of one
nation from the jurisdiction of the courts of another. United States
domestic law has long reflected the law of nations. The interaction
between American municipal law and international law is close and
substantial. The legal concepts governing sovereign immunity are no
exception.
The evolution of the law of sovereign immunity has coincided
with the development of emerging centralized governments of the
nation-states of the 18th and 19th centuries into the complex and
far-reaching mechanisms of the modern state. 2  Early case law
established the principle of absolute sovereign immunity as an ex-
1. The notion of "sovereignty," in the abstract, is a concept which
strongly implies immunity from suit. See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907), in which Justice Holmes said that "there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
2. T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3-8
(1970).
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ception to the "full and absolute territorial jurisdiction" of states.3
Foreign states could not be sued in United States courts under
any circumstances because of the "perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns. '" 4 This principle was closely followed,
but became subject to increasing criticism and debate.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN AMERICAN COURTS
The law of sovereign immunity in American courts has been
dominated by two major developments. The first was Chief Justice
John Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,
5
which established the principle of absolute sovereign immunity.
Allowing United States courts to assume jurisdiction over claims
against foreign states would be offensive to the dignity of sovereign
powers. 6  The doctrine that a state is the sole arbiter of its own
rights, and therefore cannot be sued in foreign courts without its
consent, has persisted into the twentieth century. 7  Under this
doctrine a private individual or corporation would have no recourse
against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
While the principle of absolute immunity fell into disfavor, the
courts developed the practice of deferring to executive determina-
tions of sovereign immunity. 8 The judiciary believed that because of
3. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, I 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137
(1S12). The case involved a French warship libeled and arrested in the port of
Philadelphia. The Schooner Exchange Court reversed the circuit court's decision
in McFaden v. The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 8786) which
had upheld the "general rule of the law of nations" that all property within a
national territory is subject to that nation's authority and Jurisdiction.
4. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
6. Id. at 137, 144.
7. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex Parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943); Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Mason v.
Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876 (1908); Hassard v.
Mexico, 29 Misc. 511 (1899), aff'dmem., 46 App. Div. 623 (1st Dept. 1899),
aff'dmem., 173 N.Y. 645, 66 N.E. 1110 (1903).
8. See, e.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943), in which
Chief Justice Stone concluded that it was the judiciary's "duty" to accept the
executive branch's determination as to sovereign immunity:
This practice is founded upon the policy, recognized both by the
Department of State and the courts, that our national interest will
I Vol. I
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the delicate political issues involved and the potential for embarrass-
ment to the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs,
decisions concerning the amenability 9to suit of foreign states were
properly left to the State Department. 9
The principle of absolute immunity was renounced in the
United States by the Tate letter, written by the acting legal advisor
to the Department of State, Jack B. Tate, in 1952.10 The Tate letter
marks the second major development of the law of sovereign
immunity in the United States-the adoption of the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. Stated simply, this theory restricts the im-
munity of a foreign state to suits involving foreign states' public acts
(acta jure imperl) and does not extend immunity to suits based on
be better served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our
relations with a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplo-
matic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial
proceedings.
Id. at 589. See also Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945), where the
Court enunciated a political question restriction on courts' jurisdiction; the de-
termination of whether a foreign sovereign had immunity might embarrass U.S.
foreign relations and therefore had to be left to the executive branch. See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398,427-28 (1964).
9. Ex Parte Peru and Mexico v. Hoffman represent the high water mark
of judicial deference to the executive branch in sovereign immunity questions.
In the former case, the Court held that the State Department's
certification and the request that the vessel owned and operated by
Peru and libeled for an alleged failure to carry out a charter party be
declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive
determination by the political arm of the Government that the con-
tinued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of
our foreign relations.
318 U.S. at 589. In the latter case, a ship owned by Mexico but operated by a
private Mexican corporation was not given immunity. The Court said:
We can only conclude that it is the national policy not to extend the
immunity in the manner now suggested, and that it is the duty of
the courts, in a matter so intimately associated with our foreign
policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an im-
munity to an extent which the government, although often asked,
has not seen fit to recognize.
324 U.S. at 38.
10. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See also GIUTTARIsupra, note 2
at 188-95.
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its private acts (acta jure gestionis). 11 The acceptance of the restric-
tive doctrine is a response to the increasing global interaction be-
tween different states and individuals of different states. The in-
creasing involvement of national governments in commercial enter-
prises has resulted in an increase in occasions upon which private
citizens require access to courts in order to resolve disputes involv-
ing their contacts with foreign states. 12
. Although the Tate letter contributed greatly to the establish-
ment of the restrictive theory in American law, the determination
of sovereign immunity remained under the control of the executive
branch of government. However, it was recognized that the State
Department is often responsive to political exigencies rather than to
the enunciated principle of the justiciability of government actions
in a private commercial context.13 Also, there is a certain danger
11. See von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17
CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 33-34 (1978).
12. Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of judicial Control-The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L. 1. 429 (1977). Interest-
ingly, it was Chief justice Marshall who voiced the justification for the restrictive
doctrine:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a
partner in any trading company, it divests itself ... of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communi-
cating to the company its privileges and prerogatives, it descends to
a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the char-
acter which belongs .. .to the business which is to be transacted.
. . . The government, by becoming a corporator lays down its
sovereignty.
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat)
904, 906-08 (1824). Similarly, in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934),
the Court said: "[w] hen a state enters the market place seeking customers
it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character
of a trader ..."
13. The inadequacy of executive-determined sovereign immunity is
illustrated in the vehement dissenting opinion of Justice Musmanno of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela,
420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966):
The sovereign immunity doctrine . . . is no longer a healthy mani-
festation of society. It is, in fact, an excrescence on the body of
law, it encourages irresponsibility to world order, it generates
resentments and reprisals. Sovereign immunity is a stumbling block
in the path of good neighborly relations between nations, it is a
sour note in the symphony of international concord, it encourages
[Vol. I
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in leaving the determination of legal questions to the State Depart-
ment, which lacks established procedures for taking evidence, hearing
witnesses, applying precedent, or affording an opportunity for
appellate review. 14
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
The latest significant development in this threshold area of the
law is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1 5 (FSIA), which pur-
ports to give conclusive statutory effect to the competence of United
States courts to adjudicate controversies involving foreign sovereigns.
The FSIA was enacted in part to remedy the legal defects of
leaving the determination of sovereign immunity to the State Depart-
ment. Section 1602 of the FSIA declares as a purpose of the Act
that "[cl laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States and of the States ..."16
The FSIA follows the generally accepted rule that foreign states
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts. 17
However, this immunity is not absolute and the FSIA codifies those
exceptions which make certain claims against foreign states justici-
able. Chief among those exceptions are claims arising from the com-
mercial activities of foreign states. 18  The FSIA thus clarifies the
government towards chicanery, deception and dishonesty. Sovereign
immunity is a colossal effrontery, a brazen repudiation of inter-
national moral principles, it is a shameless fraud.
Id. at 194, 215 A.2d at 893.
14. Note, supra note 12, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. at 435-36.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(d), 1391, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). This section provides that:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts
of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of
such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect
the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605
to 1607 of this chapter.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 which provides that"Julnder international law,
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
occasions upon which sovereign immunity may not be successfully
pleaded in American courts.
The determination of sovereign immunity was specifically
transferred from the Executive to the Judiciary. As stated in an
early case interpreting the FSIA, 19 the Act serves primarily to pro-
vide "a unitary rule for determination of claims of sovereign im-
munity in legal actions in the United States, thereby eliminating the
role of the State Department in such questions." 20 Determination
of sovereign immunity by the Judiciary is meant to serve the inter-
ests of justice by assuring litigants that access to the courts will be
granted or denied on consistently applied legal grounds.2 1
The FSIA has been increasingly invoked by private litigants
seeking to have their rights against foreign sovereigns determined
by American courts. Thus far the Act has received a narrow inter-
pretation manifesting the courts' inclination to tread lightly in ex-
ercising their power to decide the merits of claims against foreign
governments.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Where the foreign sovereign has not waived its immunity, 2 2
a private litigant seeking to enforce rights or remedies must invoke
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be
levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connec-
tion with their commercial activities." See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
19. Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
20. Id. at 1037.
21. The legislative history of the FSIA specifically recognized that an
objective of the Act would be to insure that the restrictive principle of immunity
would be applied in litigation before U.S. courts. Congress intended the transfer
of the determination of sovereign immunity to the judiciary to diminish the
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations. 19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6605.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) provides as the first exception to the juris-
dictional immunity of a foreign state any case "in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication . . ." Although five ex-
ceptions to jurisdictional immunity are enumerated in § 1605, courts have
treated the basis of jurisdiction as lying either in waiver or minimum contacts of
I Vol. I
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the "commercial activities" exception to immunity. Even where the
activities giving rise to the lawsuit are clearly commercial, 23 courts
have been reluctant to confer jurisdiction on constitutional grounds
of due process. The courts justify their narrow reading of the Act
by their findings of insufficient minimum contacts or lack of "direct
effect."
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 24 an early case interpreting the
FSIA, presented interesting issues because of the lack of precedent
in interpreting the Act and because of the political circumstances
that were inextricably bound up with the commercial activities of
the defendant, the Libyan Arab Jamahirya. Plaintiffs Carey and
New England Petroleum Corp. (Nepco) invoked the FSIA in an
effort to sue the government of Libya and its oil producing and
marketing arm, the Libyan National Oil Corp. (NOC), alleging breach
of contract and other violations. Nepco, through its Bahamian sub-
sidiary, had contracts with NOC for the supply of Libyan crude.
Libya, in response to the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, im-
posed an embargo on all exports of crude oil to the United States,
the Caribbean Islands and the Netherlands. Other Arab oil-producing
countries imposed similar embargoes resulting in a dramatic rise in
the world market price of oil. When oil supply resumed in early
1974 it was under newly-negotiated contracts at more than triple
the previous price. Difficulties over payments due to NOC by
Nepco's Bahamian subsidiary resulted in a further cessation of
supply. Nepco then instituted a lawsuit against NOC claiming breach
of contract and extortion by duress.
In asserting the jurisdiction of the district court over the de-
fendants, plaintiffs invoked section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA which
provides as follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States or of the States in any
the foreign state with the American forum. For further development of this
theme see Note, Waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The Scope of 28
U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), 1 N.Y.J. INT'L & CaMP. L. 159 (1980).
23. Commercial activity is defined as "either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
24. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dper curiam, 592 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1979).
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case .. . in which the action is based .. upon an act out-
side the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.25
Defendant NOC falls within the definition of a foreign state by vir-
tue of the fact that it is an entity wholly owned by the government
of Libya. 26 Thus under § 1604 of the FSIA both NOC and Libya
can .claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States.27
It is clear that the activity giving rise to the lawsuit was con-
mercial in nature. Thus the restrictive theory, denying immunity to
the commercial activities of foreign states, was brought into play.
Although Libya and NOC might have argued that the reason for im-
posing the embargo on oil exports (thereby breaching their con-
tracts) was public (to manifest their opposition to Western sup-
porters of the State of Israel) and therefore immune from the juris-
diction of United States courts, it is clear from the wording of the
FSIA that it is the nature of the activity and not its purpose which
governs. 28 It is undisputed that Libya and NOC, in executing con-
tracts for the supply of oil, were engaging in commercial or pro-
prietary activity.
Since 1952 the United States has embraced a policy declining to
extend sovereign immunity to the commercial dealings of foreign
governments. 29 This policy has been based in part on the fact that
this approach has been accepted by a large and increasing number of
foreign states in the internationai community. 30 A more compelling
reason for this approach, however, is the increasing involvement of
foreign sovereigns in international trade, making essential "a practice
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) provides that "I ti he commercial char-
acter of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose."
29. Tate Letter, 26 DmP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
30. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, n. 15 at 702 (1976). The footnote cites cases from Austria, Greece, Hong
* Kong, Italy, Pakistan, Philippines and Yugoslavia evidencing the policy of these
states which declines to extend sovereign immunity to the commercial activities
of foreign governments.
I Vol. I
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which will enable persons doing business with them to have their
rights determined in the courts.
' 3 1
The district court, in dismissing the complaint in Carey, based
its decision on the lack of any direct effect in the United States
sufficient to support the assertion of jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(2).
As is specified in its legislative history, the fundamental "minimum
contacts" requirements of due process are embodied in the FSIA.
32
Thus, in order to satisfy due process requirements, the standard set
out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 33 would have to be
met. In order to have been subject to the jurisdiction of our courts,
Libya and NOC must have had "certain minimum contacts with [the
forum statelsuch that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." 34  The
district court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held that the stan-
dard had not been met. 3 5  The district court stated that "ItIhere
has been absolutely no attempt by Libya nor NOC to avail itself
of any of the protections or privileges afforded by the United States
-rather, in fact, the reverse." 36  The court relied on Hanson v.
Denckla37 in determining that the due process requirements for
jurisdiction had not been met. The Hanson Court recognized the
trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over nonresidents first
noted in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 38 The Court
expressed the trend clearly in terms of technological progress in-
creasing the flow of commerce between States and the resulting
greater need for jurisdiction over nonresidents.39 The Court also
31. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 785. The Court in Dunhill states "that sub-
jecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial dealings pre-
sents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt
to pass on the legality of their governmental acts." 425 U.S. at 703-04.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. Id. at 316.
35. 453 F. Supp. at 1101.
36. Id.
37. 357 U.S. 235 (1953). Hanson v. Denckla is viewed by commentators
as the stopping place in the law of minimum contacts analysis. Under Hanson,
state boundaries have not lost all meaning. Even under the expansionist doc-
trine of International Shoe, the power of a State to assert personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents has certain limits.
38. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
39. 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
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noted the progress in communications and transportation which
has made the defense of suits in foreign tribunals less burdensome.
4 0
These developments are equally applicable to the international arena
and particularly to the facts in Carey. An enlightened view could
conclude that large parts of the global oil industry have an impact
upon the United States' economy and any serious legal violation
occurring in that industry would satisfy the due process requirements
enunciated in International Shoe. 4 1 The district and appeals courts
declined to adopt such an expansionist view however. The Supreme
Court in Hanson v. Denckla pointed out that the trend in relaxed re-
strictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts by no means
destroys all restrictions on jurisdiction. There are still those restric-
tions which exist as a consequence of the territorial limitations on
the power of States. 42 The Second Circuit in Carey, recognizing
these territorial restrictions, emphasized that the contracts at issue
were executed solely by Bahamian and Libyan corporations. Al-
though Nepco's Bahamian subsidiary was wholly owned, it was never-
theless a separate corporate entity. 43 The court therefore refused to
'pierce the corporate veil' in favor of those who created that veil"
and deemed the effect in the United States to be indirect.
44
40. Id. at 251. The Court goes on to conclude that as a result of these
changes, the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 715 (1877), which required
defendant's presence in the forum state for jurisdiction, has evolved into the
flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id.
41. See McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National
Law: A Policy Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REv. 25 (1959).
42. 357 U.S. at 251.
43. 592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979).
44. Id. A corporation, as a creature of law, is endowed with a separate
and distinct personality, and the separate personality of parent and subsidiary
is not lightly disregarded. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Wheeler, 419 F. Supp. 98
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1977). The District Court in
Boise went on to point out that under New York law, the corporate veil is never
pierced for the benefit of the corporation or its stockholders; the procedure is
permissible only against a purported stockholder who is using the corporate'veil
to defraud. 419 F. Supp. at 99. See Colin v. Altman, 39 A.D.2d 200, 202, 233
N.Y.S.2d 432, 433-34 (1972).
The 2d Circuit in Carev cited further cases for the proposition that one
who chooses to conduct business by the corporate form may not ignore the
existence of the corporation in order to avoid disadvantages. 592 F.2d at 676,
citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shaefer, 240 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.
1957) (the Tax Commissioner sought review of a Tax Court determination re-
I Vol. I
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The Second Circuit applied a narrow interpretation of the term
'direct effect' as it is used in the FSIA. 45 The House Report, in
discussing the jurisdiction of United States courts over the com-
mercial activities of a foreign state which cause a direct effect in the
United States, clearly indicates that the exercise of jurisdiction must
be consistent with the requirement that the effect be substantial
and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct of the
foreign state. 4 6  That the effect in Carey was substantial is not
disputed. Libya's refusal to deliver oil under the contracts caused
Nepco to be unable to deliver fuel to its customers on the East
coast. This contributed to the energy crisis of 1973-74 and the
concomitant increase in the price of oil. 4 7 Nepco, though not itself
jecting in part an asserted deficiency in the taxpayer's federal income tax for
1948). In another case, Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S.
432 (1946) the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of when corporate entities
could be disregarded. They may be disregarded where they are made the imple-
ment for avoiding a clear legislative purpose. They will not be disregarded where
those in control have deliberately adopted the corporate form in order to secure
its advantages and where no violence to the legislative purpose is done by treat-
ing the corporate entity as a separate legal person. 326 U.S. at 437. It is inter-
esting to note the Court's tacit acknowledgement of the subjective standard
which may influence the discretion of the court in determining whether to
'pierce the veil' would be appropriate in the particular case.
45. In Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978),
'direct effect' is defined as one "which has no intervening element, but, rather,
flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption." The court dismissed
plaintiff's claim for damages for injuries sustained at the Tehran airport, which,
though endured here, were caused in Tehran. Because of the lack of a 'direct
effect' the court dismissed the action for lack of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976). The Report
refers to section 18, RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1965) which provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal con-
sequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if ...
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory
is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems.
47. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1974, § 1, at 33, col. 5; July 26, 1974, §
1, at 45, col. I.
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a party to the contracts, was a party to the negotiations and a
known beneficiary of the contracts. Nevertheless, the court insisted
on a strict interpretation of the. Act and dismissed the suit.
A narrow construction of the FSIA is consistent with the
majority of the cases arising under the Act and reflects the marked
deference that the American judiciary holds toward sovereign states.
In East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra, 48 plain-
tiff,. a New York corporation, brought an action against Terra, a
Romanian state-owned trading company falling within the defini-
tion of a foreign state (§ 1603(a)). Plaintiff alleged wrongful inter-
ference with his business which precluded him from concluding a
favorable contract for the purchase of cement from a Romanian
company. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction finding that the contact of Terra with the United States
was insufficient to meet the standards of due process. The court
concluded that certain telex communications between Terra and the
plaintiff were not of the quality and nature in relation to the United
States from which the court could infer that Terra had "projected
itself" into the United States. 49 The court found that the dispatch
of telexes to the United States did not constitute activity having a
'direct effect' in the United States and was therefore an insufficient
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. Arguably, Terra's communica-
tions frustrated certain business expectations of the plaintiff. Never-
theless, Terra had a substantial interest in regulating the transaction
as far as the third-party Romanian company was concerned. In
view of the circumstances, the court found it unfair to require
Terra to defend its actions in a United States forum. The result
is consistent with current international legal norms by virtue of
the fact that Terra is a 'foreign state'. Were Terra merely a private
corporation, it is conceivable that its activities would have satisfied
the minimum contacts requirements for long arm jurisdiction.
The privileged status enjoyed by foreign states was frankl
recognized by the court in Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow.5
Plaintiff's testator sought damages for wrongful death which
occurred as a result of a fire in the Moscow National Hotel. The
court read a more restricted standard of personal jurisdiction in
the FSIA than might "constitutionally be afforded American
courts under traditional concepts of fairness and due process." 51
48. 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
49. Id. at 388-90.
50. No. 78-2352 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 9, 1979).
51. Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, No. 78-2352, slip op. at 8
( Vol. I
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Because of the exclusion of the broad "doing business" concept
from the enumerated exceptions in the FSIA, the court refused to
find the activities of a Russian-owned travel agency in New York
sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The court reasoned
as follows: "The commercial activity out of which plaintiff's claim
arises is the operation of the Hotel in Moscow; despite the apparent
integration of the Soviet tourist industry, the relationship between
the negligent operation of the National Hotel and any activity in
the United States is so attenuated that Ithe exception enumerated
in the first clause of § 1605(a)(2)-commercial activity carried on
in the United Statesl is not applicable." ' 52  Further, the court
refused to find jurisdiction because the activity which occurred in
Moscow did not have a direct effect in the United States. After a
lengthy discussion of the meaning of the term 'direct effect' the
court cited with approval Upton v. Empire of Iran53 and held
that a death occurring in a foreign jurisdiction, with no suffering
of the decedent in this country and no utilization of our health
facilities, caused only the indirect effect of grief and loss to the
decedent's family. The court alluded to the unfair result reached
in this case but placed the blame on Congress which restricted the
protection offered United States citizens by express language in
the FSIA. 54
CONCLUSION
Thus, cases involving foreign sovereigns as defendants have re-
quired a higher standard of due process for the exercise of juris-
diction. The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that it was
the intent of Congress to embody the jurisdictional standards of
International Shoe and its progeny. However, the courts have
interpreted the Act to require a higher standard. The principle that
a foreign state should be accountable in its commercial dealings with
private individuals thus loses some of its meaning. Because of the
narrow reading the courts have given to the term 'direct effect',
a foreign state can in many instances escape liability in its com-
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,1979).
52. Id. at 13-14.
53. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978). See note 45 supra.
54. Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, No. 78-2352, slip op. at 29-30
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1979).
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mercial dealings with U.S. citizens by deliberately avoiding any
meaningful contacts with the United States. Thus, private business
is faced with the same risks in dealing with foreign governments
as prior to the passage of the Act. The purposes of the FSIA thus
remain largely unrealized.
This is not due entirely to abdication by the courts. Rather it
reflects a healthy sense of realism in viewing the world economic sys-
tem. Governments, with their vast resources, enjoy a superior bar-
gaining position and do not hesitate to avail themselves of the pre-
rogatives of their privileged positions. Although the sentiment that
governments should be held accountable when engaging in proprie-
tary activities runs high, it is unrealistic to consider governments on
a parity with individuals.
The competence of the courts to extend a greater jurisdictional
reach over foreign governments can only be exercised under a clcarer
Congressional mandate than is presently expressed in the FSIA.
Congress, in view of the jealously guarded sovereignty of nations,
cannot broaden this mandate. Such a development can occur only
at some time in the future when the nations in the world have
achieved a greater measure of integration. In the meantime, those
seeking to conduct business with foreign governments should not
rely on the provisions of § 1605(a)(2) to obtain jurisdiction in the
event of breach, but, if 'their bargaining positioi, will allow, incor-
porate express waiver provisions in their contracts.
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